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INDEPENDENCE UNDER SIEGE: UNBRIDLED
CRITICISM OF JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS,
A PANEL DISCUSSION SPONSORED BY THE
BROOKLYN WOMEN'S BAR ASSOCIATION,
NOVEMBER 21, 1996
The following panel discussion, addressing the issue of criticism
of judges and prosecutors, includes the transcripts of several
notable panelists who were kind enough to permit the Journal of
Law and Policy to publish their remarks.
The Editorial Board and Staff of the Journal supplemented the
transcripts with footnotes and commentary as a way to provide
background material for the speakers' statements and to offer a
starting point for readers to begin research on some of the issues
raised. The additional footnotes and commentary are those of the
Journal and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the
speakers.
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Hon. Cheryl E. Chambers*
The Brooklyn Women's Bar Association is very pleased to have
a number of distinguished panelists here today. I'm not going to
introduce them, I'm going to have Dean Joan G. Wexler formally
introduce them to you in just a moment. But first, I'd like to offer
our statement of purpose.
The Brooklyn Women's Bar Association is committed to civil
discourse and to providing a forum to discuss issues and subjects
of great importance to the bar and the bench. Tonight we are
discussing the current controversy over judicial and prosecutorial
independence.
Better communication between segments of society is needed to
lower the tone of criticism and avoid the temptation to personalize
this controversial issue that so ignites our passions. When our
I
The author is a Judge of the Criminal Court of the City of New York and
a former Special Assistant District Attorney in the Kings County District
Attorney's Office. She is a graduate of Boston University School of Law.
Specifically, politicians have recently been critical of New York City
Criminal Court Judge Lorin Duckman, U.S. Federal District Court Judge Harold
Baer and Bronx District Attorney Robert Johnson. Administrative charges will
be filed against Judge Duckman by the New York State Commission on Judicial
Conduct based upon allegations by Governor Pataki that Judge Duckman has
displayed a bias against prosecutors and has made "disparaging comments toward
women and black people in his court." James Dao, Conduct Panel Plans Charges
Against Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1996, at B 1; Clifford J. Levy, Pataki Calls
for Judicial Panel to Remove a Brooklyn Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1996, at
B 1. Similarly, Judge Baer came under political criticism after his evidentiary
decision to exclude drug evidence from trial. "Clinton Administration officials
suggested that Judge Baer might be asked to resign if he did not change his
mind, and Congressional Republicans called for the judge's impeachment." Don
Van Natta, Jr., A Publicized Drug Courier Pleads Guilty to 3 Felonies, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 1996, § 1, at 23; see Don Van Natta, Jr., Under Pressure,
Federal Judge Reverses Decision in Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at
Al. Bronx District Attorney Johnson has been criticized by Mayor Giuliani for
his decisions regarding charges against people accused of killing police officers.
Jan Hoffman, Mayor Criticizes Manslaughter Charge in Officer's Death, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 1996, at B3.
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political leaders and the media seek to galvanize support or create
controversy by painting the judiciary and prosecutors as pro-
criminal, lacking in common sense or indifferent to the demands of
sound judgment, they tarnish and undermine the credibility of our
system of justice by destroying the moral authority of our courts
and our prosecutors.
Judges and prosecutors, however, are not immune from or
above criticism. As public servants, as the guardians of the balance
between liberty and the law, judges and prosecutors must be
accountable. We believe discussions about our system of justice
should be civil, thoughtful and well informed. To this end, we
present this panel discussion.
We selected an exceptional moderator, Brooklyn Law School's
Dean Joan G. Wexler, to guide us through our discussion this
evening. Let me tell you a little about Dean Wexler. Joan G.
Wexler is the seventh and current Dean of Brooklyn Law School.
She is the first woman to head the law school in its nearly one-
hundred year history. Dean Wexler is a 1974 graduate of Yale Law
School, where she was Articles Editor of the Yale Law Journal.
She graduated from Cornell University in 1968 with highest honors
and distinction, and received a Masters of Arts in Teaching degree
from Harvard University in 1970. Dean Wexler is a former clerk
to Federal Judge Jack B. Weinstein and a former associate in the
firm of Debevoise and Plimpton.
Dean Wexler joined the Brooklyn Law School faculty in 1985
after serving on the faculty of New York University School of
Law. She was Brooklyn Law School's Associate Dean of Academic
Affairs from 1987 to 1994. She serves on a number of boards and
committees including the Board of Directors of the Federal Bar
Council Foundation and the New York State Bar Association's
Committee on Children and the Law. Dean Wexler is currently the
Vice-President of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, where she has served on numerous committees. She has
published extensively in the areas of family and matrimonial law
and is a frequently sought after lecturer and public speaker. It gives
me great pleasure to introduce Dean Joan Wexler.
Dean Joan G. Wexler*
Good evening. Thank you Judge Chambers for inviting me to
join you tonight. I'm delighted to be here to moderate this hot topic
discussion, with this most distinguished and knowledgeable panel.
As Judge Chambers has told you, disagreement with judicial
and prosecutorial decisions has taken on an increasingly confron-
tational and personal tone, as individual judges and prosecutors are
criticized for their decisions in particular cases. Now, I would not
have the temerity to suggest to you that all opinions made by
judges and prosecutors are sacrosanct. For one thing, if that were
the case, it would put me and a whole lot of law school professors,
not to mention our appellate judges, out of work. What I would
suggest, however, is that there is a point at which such criticism
reaches intimidation, and debates over judicial philosophy deteri-
orate into exercises of partisan politics. When that point is reached,
the independence and credibility of our judicial system is jeopar-
dized, and the reputation of all three branches of government is
undermined.
Now, to start us off tonight, we have with us the Honorable
David Dinkins, former Mayor of our fair city. Currently, he is a
professor at the Columbia School of International and Public
Affairs and a Senior Fellow of the Barnard Columbia Center for
Urban Policy. Prior to becoming Mayor, he had a long career in
public service. He was a member of the New York State Assembly,
President of the New York City Board of Election and City Clerk
and President of the Borough of Manhattan. Mr. Dinkins serves on
numerous boards and committees that are involved in advocating
for children, education, compassionate urban policy and tolerance.
He also was the first male member of the National Women's
Political Caucus. But most important to me, he is a graduate of
Brooklyn Law School.
" Dean, Brooklyn Law School; J.D., Yale University; M.A.T., Harvard
University; B.S., Cornell University.
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Our second panelist is Michael A. Cardozo. Mr. Cardozo is
President of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
and is a litigation partner at the law firm of Proskauer, Rose, Goetz
and Mendelsohn. He has also been chair of the Executive Com-
mittee of the Fund for Modern Courts, the Task Force on the
Appellate Division and the Joint Committee on Judicial Admin-
istration. Although he does a wide variety of different types of
commercial litigation, he spends a substantial amount of his time
representing both the National Basketball Association and the
National Hockey League. Rumors are that after his term of office
at the city bar, he will be a free agent. I can tell you that he is a
wonderful president so I hope that the members of this bar
association will consider him for office.
Our third panelist is Zachary Carter. Mr. Carter is the United
States Attorney for the Eastern District Court of New York, our
home court here in Brooklyn. For the topic we are discussing
tonight, I don't think there are any perspectives that we should
consider that Mr. Carter does not have personal knowledge about.
He is not only now the United States Attorney, he has been an
Assistant United States Attorney of the Eastern District and the
Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division. He has served in the Kings
County District Attorney's Office as Executive Assistant District
Attorney. He was Executive Assistant to the Deputy Chief
Administrative Judge of the courts within the City of New York,
and he has been a Criminal Court Judge, a United States Magistrate
Judge and a practicing lawyer.
Our final speaker is the Honorable Judy Harris Kluger. Judge
Kluger is currently the Administrative Judge to the Criminal Court
of the City of New York. She was appointed to that court in 1988
and served as Deputy Supervising Judge in Manhattan for several
years. Judge Kluger began her career as an Assistant District
Attorney here in Kings County, where she became Chief of the Sex
Crimes and Domestic Violence Unit and later Bureau Chief of the
Criminal Court Bureau. If one of our goals tonight is to discuss
how to communicate with the public about the judicial process,
Judge Kluger has a unique perspective. In 1993, she was selected
to preside in the newly created Midtown Community Court, which
was an experiment in constructive, accessible, community-based
justice. That court has received considerable attention and acclaim
514
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for its approach, which has made the judicial system more
understandable to the members of the local community. So, we
welcome Judge Kluger for her thoughts.

Hon. David N. Dinkins*
I am delighted to be here. Let me first say what I say to
audiences very often these days: now that I have been elected a
private citizen-that's what happened-I go where I wish and I'm
here because I choose to be. I really want to be with you-it's a
subject that I care a lot about. A lot of good people, and good
friends, are here on this panel and out there (in the audience). So,
Dean Wexler, President Goldman, Judge Chambers, distinguished
fellow panelists, friends and fellow New Yorkers, it's a pleasure to
join you tonight to discuss the crisis of our criminal justice
system-the demonization of our judges and district attorneys, and
the constant attack on the independence of our judges and prose-
cutors.
Some of our most prominent public officials have chosen to
target our very system of justice, with the cheap prize of instant
public approval in their sights. "King Henry VII boasted that he
ruled England with his laws, and his laws with his judges."' Dean
John D. Feerick 2 reminded us of the tale of one English judge who
was prodded by the crown to give up his opinion or his position.
Said the judge, "From my place, . . . I care little. I am old and
worn out in the service of the crown: but I am mortified to find
that Your Majesty thinks me capable of giving a judgment which
none but an ignorant or a dishonest man could give."3 The King
replied, "I am determined ... to have twelve Judges who will be
all of my mind as to this matter,"4 to which the judge replied,
" Professor, Columbia School of International and Public Affairs; Mayor,
New York City, 1990 through 1993; J.D., Brooklyn Law School; B.S., Howard
University.
John D. Feerick, Leslie H. Arps Memorial Lecture, Judicial Independence
and the Impartial Administration of Justice, 51 REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 233,
236 (1996).
2 John D. Feerick is currently Dean of Fordham Law School. He is also the
former President of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
3 Feerick, supra note 1, at 236.
' Feerick, supra note 1, at 236.
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"Your Majesty, . . . [you] may find twelve Judges of your mind,
but hardly twelve lawyers."5
In New York City today, some political leaders attempt to turn
back the hands of time to medieval Europe, as if they were cloaked
with the power of the throne, as if the idea of an independent
judiciary, beyond the power of either the legislature or the
executive branches, had never existed; but such a system does exist,
thanks to the Framers of the U.S. Constitution. It's up to us to
ensure that an unfettered and unencumbered judiciary is not merely
a neglected concept found in a dusty treatise on jurisprudence. It's
up to us to guarantee that due process of law is more than a mere
formality, to be adhered to or not adhered to, depending on
convenience. It's up to us to guarantee that bail is understood not
as an excess of liberal government policy but as a constitutionally
protected right.'
Montesquieu, in The Spirit of Laws, 7 observed that if the
judiciary were joined to the legislative power, the power over life
and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge would
be the legislator. If the judiciary were joined to executive power,
the judge could have the force of an oppressor! Here, in our city,
the debate by our highest elected officials over our judges and our
district attorneys borders on arbitrary oppression. Each development
has been more frightening than the last. Some leaders have become
accustomed to telling us that government is not the solution to
society's problems, but the cause. Now, they have amended the
indictment to include our courts and our district attorneys.
5 Feerick, supra note 1, at 236.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment states that "[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required. . . ." Id.
'1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (Thomas Nugent trans.,
Colonial Press 1899).
Id. at 152. The translation as it appears in The Spirit of Laws reads:
[T]here is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the
legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the
judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive
power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.
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Earlier this year, Mayor Giuliani decided not to reappoint to
full terms two incumbent New York City judges, despite recom-
mendations by his own Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary and
the independent Judiciary Committee of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York that they be reappointed to full terms.9
As mayors, both Ed Koch and I agreed to reappoint all judges
approved by these committees. We opted not to substitute our
judgment for that of the impartial experts. We chose merit over
politics.'° Unfortunately, our successor chooses otherwise."
Shortly thereafter, the Mayor and the Governor began a series
of attacks on the federal and state judiciary, including Federal
District Court Judge Harold Baer and New York City Criminal
Court Judge Lorin Duckman.'2 Then, the Governor, with the
Mayor as his cheerleader, removed Bronx District Attorney Robert
Johnson from the prosecution of the slaying of a police officer
because the District Attorney allegedly failed to seek capital
punishment fast enough.'3 The Mayor also blasted District
9 John D. Feerick, Judicial Independence and the Impartial Administration
of Justice, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 3, 1996, at 2; Dan Morrison, Rudy Snub Puts Judge
Off Bench, NEWSDAY, Dec. 28, 1996, at A4.
0 David Firestone, Giuliani and Ex-Mayors Intensify Battle Over Judicial
Demotions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1995, at AI (recounting the merit screening
process for judges instituted by Mayor Koch and continued by Mayor Dinkins).
" Daniel Wise & Matthew Goldstein, Mayor's Action on Judges Stirs
Dissent, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 26, 1995, at 1 (recounting Mayor Giuliani's demotion
of two Brooklyn criminal court judges to one-year terms on the civil court bench
based upon his view that their performances were unsatisfactory, despite
satisfactory recommendations by the Mayor's Advisory Committee and the
Judiciary Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York).
12 John M. Goshko, Accusations of Coddling Criminals Aimedat Two Judges
in New York, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1996, at A3 (reporting criticism by both
Governor Pataki and Mayor Giuliani of Federal District Court Judge Harold
Baer's decision to exclude from evidence 80 pounds of cocaine and heroin
discovered by police from evidence, and similar criticism directed at New York
City Criminal Court Judge Lorin Duckman for freeing a defendant hours after
a jury had convicted him of attacking his former girlfriend); Robert C. Gottlieb,
Death Penalty Law on Trial, NEWSDAY, Mar. 22, 1996, at A53 (describing
criticism by Govemor Pataki and Mayor Giuliani against Judges Baer and
Duckman over their recent rulings as "[j]udge bashing").
3 Bill Alden, No Added Protection for Capital Defendant, N.Y. L.J., Aug.
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Attorney Johnson for failing to slap the accused with murder
charges, railing against legal experts who disagreed with his view
of the case, branding them, and I quote, "academic idiots" who
give "ridiculous opinions ... because they like to see their dumb
names in the paper."' 4 The Mayor even offered to prosecute the
case himself, saying "if the District Attorney would like to swear
me in and turn the case over to me, I'll take it over and prosecute
the darn case."' 5 These are quotes.
At the federal level, Judge H. Lee Sarokin of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals said he resigned because political attacks had
hampered his ability to render independent decisions. 16 The
Republican candidate for president took credit for that resig-
nation. 7 I believe that virtually every member of the legal
profession would say to the Mayor, the Governor and any elected
official who had interfered with our justice system: Hands Off].
A free and independent judiciary and criminal justice system is
not the privilege of generations past, but the birthright of gener-
ations to come. Judges and district attorneys, whether elected or
appointed, are not the tools of the people who appoint them, of
officials who can embarrass them or even of the people who elect
them. It is up to a judge to implement the rule of law, not to read
7, 1996, at I (reporting that after the indictment of Angel Diaz for the first
degree murder indictment of New York Police Officer Kevin Gillespie, Governor
Pataki removed Bronx District Attorney Robert Johnson from the case because
Mr. Johnson stated that it was not his "present situation" to seek the death
penalty against Mr. Diaz); Daniel Wise, Appellate Court Hears Challenge to
Removal of Bronx Prosecutor, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 4, 1996, at I (reporting that
Governor Pataki's removal of Johnson stemmed from his "impermissible policy"
never to seek the death penalty).
4 Vivian S. Toy, Prosecutor is Berated by Giuliani, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,
1996, § 1, at 23.
IS id.
16 Gavel-to-Gavel Politics, NATION, July 1, 1996, at 3 (recounting Judge H.
Lee Sarokin's belief that the political right's ferocious attacks upon his record
resulted in his inability to judge independently).
"7 Neil MacFarquhar, Federal Judge to Resign, Citing Political Attacks, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 5, 1996, at B4 (reporting Republican presidential candidate Bob
Dole's criticism that Judge Sarokin was being "too liberal" in his treatment of
criminals, referring to Judge Sarokin's decision to release a man indicted for
killing a police officer based on the prosecution's mishandling of evidence).
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public opinion polls, not to adopt partisan viewpoints and not to
kowtow or curry favor with a temporary political leadership.
Rather, we expect our judges to be principled advocates of
permanent justice, which they render without fear or favor.'"
Not that our courts always do justice. American constitutional
history is replete with opinions that today we find more than
objectionable. Consider the Dred Scott v Sandford9 decision.
Consider the Plessy v Ferguson2 ° decision. The rule of law and
the decisions made by our courts and by our district attorneys are
not sacrosanct-but they carry with them the weight of our state
and federal constitutions-and with each dispassionate enunciation
of law, we shore up the fragile foundations of our democracy. My
point is not that public officials can never question the judgment of
a judge; but I do mean that great care and discretion must be
exercised regarding who is doing it, how and when.
Free speech is a vital right.2' Inappropriate pressure to affect
an outcome is dead wrong. Our judges are not protected by a cloak
of invincibility, nor should they be. However, a judge exercising
his or her discretion is not tantamount to a judge violating his or
her oath of office. When our elected officials act as judge, jury and
prosecutor they don't help reduce crimes, they increase problems.
They view justice through different prisms depending on the
direction of the political wind. That is exactly why our judiciary
must be independent-to protect the ends of justice from the means
18 N.Y. JUD. LAW Canon 3(A)(1) (McKinney 1992) ("A judge should be
faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. He should be
unswayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.").
"9 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that Blacks were not citizens of
the United States), overruled by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the U.S. Constitution. See generally DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW,
AND POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT CASE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1981).
20 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (validating the separate but equal doctrine by
permitting racial segregation on public transportation), overruled by Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See Paul G. Kauper, Segregation in
Public Education: The Decline of Plessy v. Ferguson, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1145,
1151-56 (1954). See generally CHARLES A. LOFGEN, THE PLESSY CASE: A
LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION (1987).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.. . ." Id.
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of politics. Furthermore, the system must also be widely perceived
as independent-for those on the bench to rule without fear of the
hand of the Mayor or the Governor who can make them and who
can break them-and for our people in general to keep faith in the
fair hand of the law.
When, and if, a judge does act truly inappropriately by breaking
the law, or by abdicating his or her oath, then I say throw the bum
out! But, as much as it may appease public anger or sorrow, we
cannot tailor our laws to fit the pattern of public opinion. No
matter how terrible the crime, no matter how justified our outrage
over that crime, we cannot force our judges or our district attorneys
to bow to the pressure of political power. Media monopoly does
not give our elected leaders a monopoly on wisdom. Elective office
is a solemn vow, not a shining crown, and the voice of the people
is not always a voice of reason. After all, that is why we have a
system of laws and not a tyranny or mob rule. You and I know that
the law is not easy or simple or clear cut. Judicial decisions are
complex and controversial-they can be misinterpreted and
disliked. Indeed, democracy itself is difficult. No doubt, at times,
the weary seek easy answers and swift justice that claims to be
sure.
I am reminded of Winston Churchill's description of "democ-
racy [a]s the worst form of Government except all those other
forms that have been tried ... ."22 Our democracy is imperfect;
it is a work in progress. As members of the legal profession and as
concerned Americans, we must ever strive to make our system and
our society better and more just. In the meantime, we must protect
the fragile balance of liberty and law.
I thank you for listening.
22 Winston Churchill said:
Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this
world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or
all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of
Government except all those other forms that have been tried from
time to time.
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MODERN QUOTATIONS 55 (Tony Augarde ed.,
1991).
Michael A. Cardozo"
Thank you. It's a pleasure to be here. I'm going to give my
own perspective on this issue, and a perspective from someone
who, for twenty-five years, has worked to reform and improve the
court system, and also the perspective of someone who is the
President of the Association of the Bar which was founded in 1870,
on the theme of strengthening the judiciary and getting rid of
corrupt judges. I thought I would start by first asking the question,
what is it that we mean by prosecutorial or judicial independence?
It seems to me what we mean is the ability of a judge or a
prosecutor to decide the matter on the merits as he or she thinks
best, without any other influence over the decisionmaker other than
the facts before him or her.
The judge or the prosecutor has to decide the case on the
merits, and not be swayed by pressure. But we are a democracy,
and with a democracy comes the right for people to criticize. There
have to be checks. And I think the issue that we have to be
concerned with is, where is the line? Where is it and when is it that
people overstep the line, and what can we do about it? Let me set
the stage, in my view, by just citing a couple of, what I think, are
egregious examples of where the politicians and the media have
crossed the line, and then I will talk about what I think we should
do about it.
Recent press reports say the Governor says the legislature
overruled five court of appeals decisions last term.' That is an
President, Association of the Bar of the City of New York. Michael
Cardozo is also a partner at the law firm of Proskauer, Rose, Goetz &
Mendelsohn. J.D., Columbia Law School; A.B., Brown University.
See, e.g., Gary Spencer, OCA Cheers Legislative Session, N.Y. L.J., July
18, 1996, at 1 (quoting Governor Pataki as saying that "[t]his year alone we have
succeeded in overturning five Court of Appeals decisions"). People v. Damiano
was essentially repealed by a statute permitting judges to submit annotated
verdict sheets to juries. 87 N.Y.2d 477, 663 N.E.2d 607, 640 N.Y.S.2d 451
(1996); see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.20 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1996).
People v. McNair was essentially repealedby a statute permitting judges to offer
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irresponsible and erroneous statement, because, as those of you who
follow this issue know, the court of appeals was interpreting a
statute passed by the legislature, and in four of the five decisions
that the Governor has cited, the Office of Court Administration
supported a change in legislation. Nevertheless, the Governor says
the legislature overruled the court of appeals.2 I think that is
irresponsible and misleading, as Judge Simons said as recently as
yesterday.' Second example: the Governor said for a judge to set
bail at $10,000.00 for a cop killer is an outrage-no discussion of
what the purpose of bail is; no discussion of the fact that it took
three months for this alleged cop killer to post bail; and no
discussion of the rest of the requirements in the bail statute.4
electronic monitoring as a condition of probation. 87 N.Y.2d 772, 665 N.E.2d
167, 642 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1996); see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4) (McKinney
1987 & Supp. 1996). People v. Page was essentially repealed by a statute
affording judges broad discretion to substitute alternate jurors for tardy jurors.
88 N.Y.2d 1, 665 N.E.2d 1041, 643 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1996); see N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 270.35(2)(a) (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1996). People v. Bolden was
essentially repealed by a statute which states that pretrial delay cannot be charged
to prosecutors when the defendant absconds. 81 N.Y.2d 146, 613 N.E.2d 145,
597 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1993); see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(4)(c) (McKinney
1992 & Supp. 1996). People v. Keindl was essentially repealed by a statute
eliminating the requirement in a case of continued sexual abuse against a child
that the child who is repeatedly molested recall the actual dates of abuse. 68
N.Y.2d 410, 502 N.E.2d 577, 509 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1986); see N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 30.10 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1997).
2 Spencer, supra note 1, at 1 (stating that for three of the five court of
appeals decisions that Governor Pataki cited as having been repealed by statute,
court officials had pursued changes in legislation akin to those which ultimately
resulted).
3 Gary Spencer, Simons Retires, and Court Loses a Calming Intellect, N.Y.
L.J., Jan. 2, 1997, at 1. Judge Simons stated that Governor Pataki's criticism of
the court would be potentially "debilitating" and that, "'[t]he courts rely upon the
respect that the public has for them and the respect that they give our decisions
... If somebody is misconstruing our decisions and telling the public over and
over again that we're pandering to criminals, it certainly could weaken the
Court."' Id.
' Mark Mooney, Detective Bailed Out Suspect in Cop Slaying, DAILY NEWS,
Oct. 17, 1996, at 24 (stating that Detective Robert Rivers, Jr., posted $10,000.00
bail to release his accused nephew, Anthony Rivers, notwithstanding "outraged
pleas" from Governor Pataki that Anthony Rivers be charged with murder and
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The media, I think, egged on by the politicians, has been
equally outrageous. While we all have our favorite stories, the one
or two that particularly get my blood boiling are the following.
You may remember the school gun case where the appellate
division found that a student would have to be reinstated even
though he had been found with a gun in his pocket.5 The news-
paper reports in the popular press failed to note that in an earlier
proceeding the judge had found no probable cause for the finding
of the gun, and most importantly the city had not appealed that
decision-it was res judicata. So when the issue came before the
appellate division, it wasn't a question of whether or not there was
probable cause-that had been determined. But the Daily News
said, "What were these judicial kooks thinking? ... The Appellate
Division put the 'rights' of a gun-toting teenager above the safety
of all the youngsters[,] . . which would make perfect sense if the
judges had been wearing straitjackets instead of robes.",6 That goes
beyond the pale. Another editorial called them judicial loonies.7
If this is what the public press says, what is it that the average
citizen is supposed to think? Why is this bad? Obviously it's bad
if it has the effect of causing judges or prosecutors, depending upon
the case, to decide something not on the merits. Our judges are
very courageous, but they're also human beings. And if you beat
people over the head long enough and loud enough, sometimes they
kept incarcerated). Anthony Rivers was charged with criminally negligent
homicide following the death of Officer Vincent Guidice, who fell on a mirror
and fatally impaled his leg as he attempted to intervene in an altercation between
Rivers and his girlfriend, Gloria Virgo. Id. See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 150.30(4) (McKinney 1992) (enumerating the various procedures and
limitations for the administration of bail).
' In re Juan C. v. Cortines, 223 A.D.2d 126, 647 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1st Dep't
1996) (holding that a student who had been illegally searched by a school
security guard could not be suspended for gun possession).
6 Editorial, Junk Justice Aims at Schools, DAILY NEWS, Sept. 19, 1996, at
46 (commenting on an appellate division decision holding that the search of a
15-year-old high school student, and subsequent seizure of a gun, was improper).
7 See Michael Finnegan et al., Gov Eyes Law to Expel Gun-Toting Students,
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 20, 1996, at 7 (quoting Governor Pataki as saying "[i]t is
lunacy" that an appellate division ruling placed the rights of a gun-toting
teenager above the safety of other students).
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stop doing what they think is right.8 But I think there's another
equally important concern related to these improper attacks in the
judiciary and that is the reality that they are causing the public to
lose confidence in the system that we have, which, as David
Dinkins said, may not be the best system in the world but we
haven't figured out a better way.9 And if the public starts lacking
confidence in our judicial system, anarchy can be the result.
Now what are we going to do about it? I don't think there's
been enough talk about what the bar and the judiciary can do about
these improper attacks. I'm afraid it's pretty easy for us all to reach
a consensus that it's wrong. One thing I don't think we should
do-and some disagree-is I don't believe that judges should speak
out other than through their opinions. I think the press-and we've
seen examples of it already-will twist their words. It is demean-
ing, and that is the wrong way to address this problem. But, I
understand their frustration because they say: "Who is speaking for
us?"
That's what brings us to a discussion of the bar associations,
like your bar association, like the bar association of which I am
president. The bar associations have a responsibility to step up to
the plate and defend the judges when they're improperly attacked.
Now, how do we do that? It seems to me that there are a number
of different levels. There must be an immediate response when
there's an improper attack. And unfortunately, as lawyers, we have
the habit-the proper habit-of saying we can't speak until we
know the facts. But what we do know without knowing a single
' See, e.g., Elaine Song, The Battle Over Baer, CONN. LAW. TRIB., Apr. 15,
1996, at I (discussing Federal District Court Judge Harold Baer's decision to
exclude 80 pounds of cocaine evidence, which became an issue in the 1996
presidential campaign); Editorial, A Federal Judge Backs Down, ROCKY MTN.
NEWS, Apr. 4, 1996, at A60 (discussing Judge Baer's decision to reverse his
previous ruling that 80 pounds of cocaine evidence was inadmissible, after
pressure from many politicians). See generally Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial
Independence, Adequate Court Funding, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 52 MD.
L. REV 217 (1993); W.F. Rylaarsdam, Judicial Independence-A Value Worth
Protecting, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1653 (1993).
9 Hon. David N. Dinkins, Independence Under Siege: Unbridled Criticism
of Judges and Prosecutors, A Panel Discussion Sponsored by the Brooklyn
Women's Bar Association, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 517, 522 (1997).
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fact is, what is the purpose of bail, and what is the purpose of the
exclusionary rule. We can get that word out within five minutes of
the improper attack, and we've got to do better in doing that.
We also have to, when something happens improperly, speak up
and speak up loudly. About a month ago, the Governor appointed
his counsel, Michael Finnegan, to be on the Commission on
Judicial Nominations that selected people for the New York Court
of Appeals."0 Our association felt that was wrong, and we put out
a press release within three hours saying the Governor was
wrong." Not surprisingly, the Governor did not change his mind,
despite the obvious eloquence of the press release. But, I think he
may think twice the next time, and that's really the point.
There are issues we know are coming. We know that when the
Commission on Judicial Conduct comes down with its ruling on
Judge Lorin Duckman there is a substantial likelihood that the
Governor is going to repeat his call that Judge Duckman should be
removed from office by the legislature. 2 The Governor has made
clear that he's not sure about that, but he may.'3 So we should be
"o Daniel Wise, Pataki Action is Denouncedby City Bar, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 13,
1996, at 1 (citing differing views about controversy surrounding the appointment
of Michael Finnegan to the State Commission on Judicial Nominations); Today's
News Update, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 10, 1996, at 1 (noting the objections among bar
groups and law deans to the appointment of Finnegan to the New York State
Commission on Judicial Nomination).
Wise, supra note 10, at 1.
2 See Matthew Goldstein, Judge's Courtroom Tactics Focus of Hearing,
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 17, 1996, at I (basing this position on the belief that New York
City Criminal Court Judge Lorin Duckman has a history of ignoring the rules of
criminal procedure and being biased against prosecutors); Matthew Goldstein,
Removal of Judge From Bench Can Proceed by Varied Routes, N.Y. L.J., Feb.
29, 1996, at 7 (citing Governor Pataki's statement that he will request Judge
Duckman's removal, in the event that the Commission on Judicial Conduct fails
to recommend it); George E. Pataki, Governor Responds to Bars' Resolution,
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 1996, at 2 (defending Governor Pataki's decision to refer
Judge Duckman to the Commission on Judicial Conduct, to investigate whether
Duckman believes that domestic violence is not a crime, rendering Duckman
unfit to sit on the criminal bench).
3 Pataki, supra note 12, at 2 (stating Governor Pataki's view that if
sufficient evidence indicates that Judge Lorin Duckman believes "that domestic
violence is not a crime" then removal from the bench is a suitable resolution).
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prepared to deal with that. And, in fact, I brought with me, for
those of you who are interested, a report that we have already
prepared that says the Judge Duckman case should go no further,
and explains why.'4
At the same time that we are coming to the defense of the
judges and defending the system, we have to be careful, it seems
to me, not to go too far. Not every judge's decision is right, as
people have said. We shouldn't get in the habit of everyone picking
up the newspaper and seeing "Bar Association Defends," so that
people start saying: "Oh, the bar association, what do you think?"
We shouldn't be afraid responsibly to say when we think a process
is wrong when we encourage appeals. There are ways to be far
more evenhanded in the criticism of judges, and we should lead the
way.
We also have to do better in educating the public, and this is
very difficult. We have to try and get into the schools and explain
what is going on. We have to explain, not to just the readers of the
New York Law Journal, which is easy, and not just to the readers
of the New York Times, which is relatively easy-we have to talk
to the popular press, to the radio and television and cable news
shows. That's where news is made. It's very difficult. I've had a
lot of frustration in my modest effort to do it, but I think bar
associations have to constantly try to do that.
Let me throw out one other provocative suggestion: even when
you are a lawyer elected mayor or governor, you're still subject to
the responsibilities that a lawyer has. One of those responsibilities
is that you can't improperly criticize a judge. 5 And, in this
" See generally TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION AND COURT MERGER
OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, JUDICIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE JUDGE LORIN DUCKMAN
CASE SHOULD NOT BE REFERRED TO THE STATE SENATE (June 1996) (on file
with Journal of Law and Policy) (discussing the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York's disapproval of legislative intervention in cases of judicial
misconduct and its position that responsibility should be given to the New York
State Commission on Judicial Conduct, which is highly qualified to deal with
such affairs).
"5 N.Y. JUD. LAW DR 8-102(B) (McKinney 1992) ("A lawyer shall not
knowingly make false accusations against ajudge or other adjudicatory officer.").
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.2(a) (1996) ("A lawyer
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borough, in fact, the court of appeals upheld the censure of the
former District Attorney in Brooklyn, when she improperly
criticized a judge, knowing that what she said was wrong.16 Now,
we have to be very careful in exercising this power, but disci-
plinary authorities have authority over public officials who are
lawyers who abuse their trust.
Let me end with one last thought: what are the institutional
changes, if any, that should be made to increase judicial inde-
pendence? Federal District Court Judge Harold Baer has lifetime
tenure-that does give him a degree of independence that our state
court judges do not enjoy. On the other hand, there is a very good
case that can be made that if the judge is in fact a bum, there
should be an opportunity to throw him or her out. It's an issue that
deserves serious debate as to the price that has to be paid for
judicial independence. And I will suggest to you one other solution
which I know may not be too popular among many here. If a judge
is subject to election pressures or appointive pressures, it is
inevitable that the possibility may creep into his or her mind as a
difficult case is being decided: "Will this affect my ability to be re-
elected or re-appointed?" That's human nature.
If, in fact, we adopt the system that we have for selecting
judges in the New York State Court of Appeals-a process that we
are seeing unfold right now, where political leaders nominate
people to a judicial nominating committee, which then presents
candidates to a nominator, and in cases of re-election, if the person
is found qualified, presents the one name-I believe there could be
shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless
disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a
judge . . . ."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-102(B)
(1996) (stating the same rule as New York's DR 8-102(B)).
16 In re Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d 184, 577 N.E.2d 30, 573 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1991).
Elizabeth Holtzman, then District Attorney of Kings County, received a letter of
reprimand for making false accusations against Judge Irving Levine. Id. at 190,
577 N.E.2d at 32, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 41. The court of appeals affirmed the
appellate division in finding that Ms. Holtzman violated DR 8-102 and
1-102(A)(6) by "releas[ing] to the media ... a false allegation of specific
wrongdoing, made without any support other than the interoffice memoranda of
a newly admitted trial assistant ... ." Id. at 191, 577 N.E.2d at 33, 573
N.Y.S.2d at 42.
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a substantial increase in judicial independence without sacrificing
the ability left to someone's term to get rid of the bum.
So, in conclusion, I would urge that judges should only speak
out through their opinions. The bar must be much more vigilant
and much more outspoken in trying to defend against improper
attacks, and at the same time offer constructive criticism. And, I
think we should take a look at making some institutional changes
on how we select judges, which I think would help with respect to
judicial independence.
Thank you.
Zachary W Carter*
We look to judges and prosecutors to make decisions for us that
we are not in a position to make for ourselves because we have
vested interest in controversies in which we are embroiled as civil
litigants; because we have vested interest in controversies in which
we have an emotional stake, such as situations in which we are
relatives of crime victims, or we are victims of crime ourselves or
when we are accused of crime. We look to judges and prosecutors
to be neutral arbitrators of law and fact and to make decisions in
good faith that are based on considerations only of law and facts,
experience, good judgment and fairness. And we expect of both
judges and prosecutors that they will arrive at their decisions by
drawing on reserves of character and courage and a willingness to
make decisions that are conscientious in the face of criticism.
I think that both judges and prosecutors should be required
to-and we reasonably should expect that they will-make
decisions even in controversial cases, in the face of criticism. I
think that judges and prosecutors of average courage can be
expected to perform that way. But when judges particularly are
faced with criticism that rises to the level of relentless calls for
their removal from the bench, then we are asking them not to act
with courage, but to act with heroism. And while we should
reasonably expect that judges will act with courage, day in and day
out, it's asking a bit much of judges who are human, and prose-
cutors who are human, to engage in daily acts of heroism-which
is what you're asking of a judge when you are asking him or her
to make decisions that jeopardize his or her very livelihood.
At bottom, it seems to me that what we have to ask
ourselves-as practitioners before the bar, and as persons who
litigate against prosecutors who make discretionary decisions
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York. Zachary
Carter also served as a United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of
New York. J.D., New York University School of Law; B.A., Cornell University.
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affecting clients-what kind of judge or prosecutor do we want to
face in the middle of the night when we have a client, or when we
have a loved one, whose fate is to be determined by someone who
is making an important discretionary decision about his or her life?
I have sat in criminal court in the middle of the night with a
two-hundred case calendar-many of the cases involving alle-
gations of domestic violence where I've been called upon to make
determinations both involving bail and whether or not to issue
orders of protection. I've sat in situations in which I have been
required to determine whether or not someone accused of a
homicide should be detained without bail. I've sat in situations in
which the equity stacked in one direction or another. Having judges
faced with those kinds of decisions, as I know that judges are, night
in and night out, day in and day out, we have to ask ourselves
whether or not we would want to appear before a judge who the
day before has been subjected to the most blistering criticism on
the front page of the New York Post.'
What if your young son, who may have made the mistake of
associating with a friend whom you had been counseling him not
to associate with for ages, rode with that friend as the passenger of
a car that turned out to be stolen, and that car happened to collide
with a citizen and either injured or killed that person? You need to
Such criticism may have a profound impact upon the judge and the judicial
system. For example, Federal District Court Judge Harold Baer was the subject
of a front-page article under the title of "Junk Justice" after excluding evidence
in a recent criminal trial. Rick Hampson, Junk Justice? Evidence Rulings Spur
Debate, CHI. SuN-TMES, Feb. 4, 1996, at 57. Specifically, the judge excluded
80 pounds of cocaine and heroin from evidence, reasoning that the fact that the
defendants fled upon the officers' approach did not constitute probable cause to
search the vehicle in which the drugs were found. Fred Kaplan, New York
Officials Bash Judges'Rulings, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 9, 1996, at 3. As a result
of the subsequent public outcry, "many lawyers said that they will not be
surprised if Baer finds reasons to rule that the drug evidence is admissible." John
M. Goshko, Accusations of Coddling Criminals Aimed at Two Judges in New
York, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1996, at A3. Should such criticism continue to be
heaped upon judges, many fear that judges will start to alter their decisions to
shield themselves. In fact, "many lawyers said that ... they now see signs of
defendants being subjected to higher bail, rulings that lean heavily toward the
prosecution and tougher sentences when found guilty." Id.
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ask yourself whether or not you would want your son's fate, with
respect to whether or not he's going to be detained, determined by
a judge who is overly concerned about a level of criticism that I
think we would all agree would be unreasonable.
David Dinkins said that "the voice of the people is not always
a voice of reason.",2 And it's for that reason that we leave to key
discretionary decisionmakers and the criminal justice system those
decisions that we simply cannot make for ourselves. We look to
judges and prosecutors in the middle of the night, under tremen-
dous pressure to evaluate cases on their merit, based on their
judgment of the facts and of the law, to determine whether or not,
in fairness, a defendant is to be released on bail or detained-
whether or not a defendant is to be charged or not. We should hope
that an atmosphere is allowed to persist that permits judges to
exercise their discretion, free of unreasonable criticism, free of calls
for removal from the bench if they make a decision with which one
political figure or another disagrees.
I believe that criticism of the judiciary and of prosecutors is, at
the same time, healthy. I think that a civil debate about the
decisions-whether it's in the area of bail or charging decisions, or
whether or not the death penalty should be sought or not-are
matters that should be debated in a free society. I think that judges
and prosecutors, if they are wise and if they are secure, can
reasonably take into account constructive criticisms-the views of
their neighbors, the view of the citizenry in general, as to whether
or not a decision makes sense in fairness and justice, and in
common sense. But, it seems to me, that we should encourage our
political leaders not to make every single decision an occasion for
referendum on whether or not a particular judge should continue to
serve, or whether or not a particular prosecutor should continue to
hold office. That I consider to be unreasonable.
Thank you.
2 Hon. David N. Dinkins, Independence Under Siege: Unbridled Criticism
of Judges and Prosecutors, A Panel Discussion Sponsored by the Brooklyn
Women's Bar Association, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 517, 522 (1997).
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Hon. Judy Harris Kluger"
Thank you Dean Wexler and members of the panel and friends
and colleagues. I have deep professional roots in Brooklyn, and it's
a pleasure to be back here and speak to all of you on this important
and very timely topic. The cornerstone of our justice system is
judicial independence, and the essence of being an independent
judge is the ability to decide cases on the facts and law, without
any extraneous influences, and without the fear that an unpopular
decision will result in a personal attack on your integrity, intellect
and ability.
Recently, the courts, and judges in particular, have come under
intense public criticisms. Almost daily, there is some type of news
coverage that second guesses judges and their decisions. The phrase
"junk justice"' has become part of our everyday language. There is
no doubt that public confidence in the court system is directly
* Administrative Judge of the Criminal Court of the City of New York.
"Junk Justice" refers to the tabloid title given to seemingly unjust outcomes
resulting from the release of apparently guilty defendants by judges due to legal
technicalities. Recently, this title has been used primarily to refer to cases in
which judges have excluded highly incriminating evidence due to the exclu-
sionary rule-that is, evidence which is excluded from trial because it was
"obtained unconstitutionally by the police." Rick Hampson, Junk Justice?
Evidence Rulings Spur Debate, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 4, 1996, at 57. An
example of such a case is the highly publicized decision regarding a warrant used
to search the residence of Meloin Gardner. The search was found unconstitutional
and evidence dismissed because the search was conducted at 6:30 P.M. while the
warrant had specified police "could enter 'at any time of the day."' Id. The
presiding judge considered night and daytime searches to be ftndamentally
different, since there are heightened safety concerns at night, when more people
are likely to be present at home. Id. However, the exclusionary rule is not the
only technicality implemented by judges which has precipitated the outcry of
so-called "junk justice." In March 1996, an appellate judge overturned a
conviction for car theft citing that "[the judge] did not approve in writing the
substitution of an alternate juror. He did approve the switch orally, but the court
noted the law demands written consent... . The New York Post, in a front-page
headline, called it 'Junk Justice."' Fred Kaplan, New York Officials Bash Judges'
Rulings, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 9, 1996, at 3.
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related to the public's perception of the quality of the judiciary.
While no one likes to be criticized, judges understand that courts
are a public institution, and therefore, a certain level of scrutiny is
expected, and sometimes even warranted. However, the mean-
spirited tone, the personal attacks and the frequent factual and legal
inaccuracies in accounts of judicial decisions are particularly
disturbing.'
Recently, a newspaper published an article about a domestic
violence tragedy. The article inaccurately reported that the judge
released the defendant without bail on a prior case involving the
same parties. The account was completely false. The defendant was
never before the court, and the issue of bail was never addressed.
This was particularly disturbing, since the reporter was given an
accurate account of the facts by the judge.3 But, in a rush to blame
someone-the judge-for this terrible tragedy, the facts were
ignored. Although a corrected version of the events was printed
several days later, deeper into the newspaper-basically at the
urging of the court's communications director-the damage was
done.4
Bail decisions have increasingly come under attack.5 If a
defendant commits a new crime while released on bail, the judge
who set the original bail is often criticized, and the critics ignore
2 Attacks upon judges have been particularly harsh in tone. For example, a
newspaper reported that Governor Pataki "blasted" an appellate judge for
allowing a child to carry a gun to school, calling the decision "lunacy." Michael
Finnegan et al., Gov EyesLaw to Expel Gun-Toting Students, DAILY NEWS, Sept.
20, 1996, at 7.
3 Jose Lambiet et al., Man Shoots Ex, Kills Self, DAILY NEWS, Oct. 12,
1996, at 7 (reporting erroneously that Bronx Criminal Court Judge Laura Safer
Espinosa had previously released Louis Cordero without bail on a prior
harassment charge before he shot his wife and then killed himself).
4 Don Gentile, Threats, Then Ex Was Shot, DAILY NEWS, Oct. 13, 1996, at
13. This article attempted to correct a previous article which had erroneously
reported that Judge Laura Safer Espinosa had released Louis Cordero on a prior
occasion without bail or a harassment charge. "In fact," the paper notes,
"Cordero had not been arrested and did not appear before the judge." Id.
5 See Daniel Wise, 26 Bar Groups Join to Defend Judiciary, N.Y. L.J., Mar.
8, 1996, at 1 (describing Governor Pataki's criticism of New York City Criminal
Court Judge Lorin Duckman's decision to lower the bail of a defendant who
subsequently killed his former girlfriend).
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any discussion of New York State law which prohibits preventative
detention.6
It's easy for outsiders who have minimal contact with the daily
volume of cases that come across a judge's bench to second guess
our decisions. One of the positive aspects of responsible scrutiny
and criticism is that it can identify problems and galvanize the need
and the attention for procedural, systemic or legislative changes.
We all welcome that kind of input. A good example is some of the
attention that has been focused on domestic violence cases-that
highlighted the need to strengthen the laws regarding orders of
protection. 7 And there were some very, very well-reasoned articles
and discourse on the issue of orders of protection and their
deterrent effects which resulted in a change in legislation.'
6 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (McKinney 1995) (setting criteria for
determining whether bail or recognizance will be applied in criminal cases).
Unlike federal law, which sets out standards that permit a court to
commit a defendant for preventive detention to reasonably assure the
safety of the community ... the sole objective to be considered when
a New York court exercises discretion in choosing between jail and
bail, and in the case of the latter the form and amount thereof, is 'the
kind and degree of control or restriction that is necessary to secure [the
principal's] court attendance when required ....
Peter Preiser, Practice Commentary, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30
(McKinney 1995).
7 See, e.g., Alice McQuillan et al., He Was Freed to Kill: Judge Released
Obsessed Stalker, DAILY NEWS, Feb. 14, 1996, at 5 (discussing the highly
publicized case of Galina Komar, a battered woman who was murdered after
Judge Lorin Duckman released her boyfriend, Benito Oliver, who was in prison
for beating Ms. Komar); Matthew Purdy & Don Van Natta, Jr., Before the
Murder: A Judicial Journey; An Abuse Union, a Testy Judge and a Chaotic
System That Failed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1996, at BI (same). See also Lynette
Holloway, Police Say Man Killed Ex-Girlfriend and Himself, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
31, 1996, at B4 (reporting murder of a Bronx woman, who was stabbed by her
former boyfriend despite an order of protection against him); Clifford Krauss,
Man Fatally Shoots His Wife in Her Manhattan Office, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
1996, at 27 (discussing Pasquelle Coppola's murder of his wife, despite an order
of protection forbidding him from coming near her).
" See generally Marion Wanless, Note, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward
Eradicating Domestic Violence, But Is It Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533
(discussing the deterrent effects of mandatory arrest on domestic violence
offenders). See also Jan Hoffman, Pataki Signs Bill Seeking to Combat Domestic
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The criminal court where I sit is one of the biggest and busiest
in the country. Last year, over one million appearances were
scheduled in that court and a half million were processed. With
heavy case loads and inadequate facilities, judges and court
personnel function under conditions that are less than ideal, to say
the least. Some of our critics have never spent one minute in our
courts. Do they know that on any given day a judge handles
between 150 and 200 calendar cases, each involving different issues
and parties who deserve the judge's time and attention? Some court
parts worked until seven, eight and nine o'clock at night, just to
finish their calendars. Many crucial decisions have to be made in
minutes and sometimes in seconds.9
Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1996, at A I (citing Assemblywoman Susan John's
hope that legislative changes surrounding orders of protection, including the
institution of mandatory arrest provisions, "could have a deterrent effect").
See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4) (McKinney 1992 & Supp.
1997) (creating mandatory arrest where defendant has committed a felony (other
than larceny) against a family or household member; or defendant has violated
an order of protection; or defendant has committed a misdemeanor which
constitutes a family offense and the victim has not requested that there be no
arrest); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.51(b)-(d) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1997)
(violation of an order of protection constitutes criminal contempt in the first
degree, a class E felony); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.52 (McKinney 1988 & Supp.
1997) (adding crime of aggravated criminal contempt, a class D felony, defined
as a violation of an order of protection where defendant intentionally or
recklessly causes physical injury or serious physical injury to the person for
whom the order was issued).
9 See, e.g., Jorge Fitz-Gibbon, Court Tries Patience Justice's Wheels Slow,
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 17, 1995, at I (noting that citywide the number of criminal
cases has increased249% since 1985; in the Bronx criminal cases increased from
about 50,000 in 1993 to 61,189 in 1994, while courtrooms are overburdened and
employees overworked); Judith S. Kaye, Federalism Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 1994, at A29 (noting that there has been a disproportionate increase in
the caseload of state, criminal and family courts, yet New York State courts and
judges lack basic tools such as computers, fax machines and digital phones);
Douglas Martin, Rising Pressure in Criminal Court: The View from the Bench,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1987, § 1, at 29 (describing a Manhattan Criminal Court
judge's daily caseload, and noting that an average arraignment took less than four
minutes each); Justice Decayed: The City's Crumbling Courts, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 14,
1993, at 9 (documenting the physical deterioration in the city's courthouses and
its impact on the attitudes of judges, the bar and the public). See generally
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As criticism of the judiciary has increased, so has the temp-
tation for judges to speak out and respond to that criticism. But it's
important to remember that we are bound by rules of conduct that
limit how we can respond to criticism.' ° We are more restricted
than the public officials and the members of the press in what we
can say. A judge cannot comment on a pending case." In view of
what's happened over the last year or so, there has been a sug-
gestion that these rules be changed and judges be allowed to
comment publicly, even on pending cases.' 2 I think before such
a change is made, we should all stop and think. Is that what we
want from our judges? To enter the public fray? To appear on
television? To be interviewed in the press? To discuss rulings while
cases are pending? Wouldn't that cast out on our impartiality, on
our objectivity? What would that do to judicial independence?
The public needs to be aware that judges' work and pro-
fessional lives are under a very different set of rules than those who
criticize us. We can't enter the public fray, nor should we in the
same way as others. The rules are intended to keep the judges
independent and immune from the political trends that can change
daily. It has been very encouraging to hear Mr. Cardozo and the
bar associations speak about speaking out for judges. The newly
formed Joint Commission to Preserve the Independence of the
Judiciary 3 is heartening to us, and I hope that they will be
DAVID HEILBRONER, ROUGH JUSTICE: DAYS AND NIGHTS OF A YOUNG D.A.
(1990) (recounting the pressures on a Manhattan Assistant District Attorney in
New York's criminal justice system).
10 N.Y. JUD. LAW Canon 3(A)(6) (McKinney 1992) (stating that while a
judge "should abstain from public comment about a pending proceeding in [any]
court," a judge is not prohibited from "making public statements in the course
of [his or her] official duties or from explaining for public information the
procedures of the court").
11 Id.
12 Abraham G. Gerges, Allowing Judges to Answer Back, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 14,
1996, at 2 (arguing that the Code of Judicial Conduct should be amended to
permit judges to make public comments and to respond to criticism).
13 The Joint Committee to Preserve the Independence of the Judiciary is a
non-partisan group which originated in a statement published in the New York
Law Journal on March 8, 1996. Daniel Wise, supra note 5, at 1. The joint
committee, consisting of 26 bar groups and six law school deans, stated its
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speaking out quickly on issues that relate to the courts. The public
has to understand the criminal justice system and the court system.
Judges are accountable to the public and we are in the public eye
and we are not immune from criticism. But the discourse should be
informed, productive and fair-minded.
Thank you.
mission "to develop proposals for insuring the independence of the judiciary
from partisan attack and to coordinate timely responses to intemperate or
misleading attacks upon individual judges or the judicial system" and to "initiate
efforts to foster public awareness and understanding of the workings of the legal
system and the importance of an independentjudiciary." Daniel Wise, supra note
5, at 1. Since its inception, the joint committee has issued statements urging
presidential candidates to cease making personal attacks on judges. Candidates
Urged to Halt Judge Attacks, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 3, 1996, at 2. The joint committee
has also recommended that Governor Pataki reconsider the appointment of his
counsel, Michael Finnegan, to the Committee on Judicial Nomination. Concern
Expressed with PatakiAppointee, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Nov. 1996, at
50.
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Hon. Abraham G. Gerges*
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution, with great vision,
carefully and specifically separated the branches of government to
secure independence. The Framers ensured that a democratic
government would survive and that our citizenry would be
protected from unreasonable governmental interference. Judicial
independence is truly one of the cornerstones of a democratic
nation.
To guarantee the requisite independence and impartiality of the
judiciary, the Framers granted life tenure to federal judges to
insulate the judiciary from the vicissitudes of politics.2 The
judiciary, however, while independent of the executive and the
legislative branches of government, is nonetheless influenced by
these branches. The executive branch, at the federal and state
levels, has great power to shape the judiciary through the often
partisan appointment process.' The legislature enacts the laws,
thereby establishing the framework from which the judiciary must
operate. Because the judiciary is already shaped by the other
branches of government and must operate within the framework
. Justice, Supreme Court of the State of New York; Treasurer, Association
of Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of New York; Editor, The Jurist;
Chairperson, Office of Court Administration (statewide effort aimed at improving
the public's understanding and perception of the judiciary); Guest Lecturer;
Author, numerous articles on the criminal justice system.
See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that
an independent judiciary is essential to public justice and democracy).
2 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour .... ").
' See Hon. Daniel R. Deja, How Judges Are Selected: A Survey of the
Judicial Selection Process in the United States, 75 MICH. B.J. 904 (1996)
(surveying various methods of partisan and non-partisan judicial selection and
appointments).
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created by them, any further encroachment on its independence
would violate the very essence of democratic process.4
It is important to understand that judges are bound by their oath
of office to uphold laws, even unpopular ones. The exclusionary
rule is certainly one body of law that the public does not com-
prehend and, consequently, decries.' A better understanding by the
public of this, and other, often arcane rules of law would certainly
be of benefit.
Criticism of the judiciary is a vital component of our democ-
racy and system of justice. The stridency of the criticism of late,
however, undermines the credibility of and erodes public faith in
the judiciary. Certain segments of the media and politicians eager
for publicity seize upon the sensational aspects of legal rulings.6
4 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.").
' The exclusionary rule "commands that where evidence has been obtained
in violation of the search and seizure protections guaranteed by the U.S. Consti-
tution, the illegally obtained evidence cannot be used at the trial of the
defendant." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (6th ed. 1990). See Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment).
6 See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, Mayor Criticizes Manslaughter Charge in Officer's
Death, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1996, at B3 (describing the criticism of Bronx
District Attorney Robert Johnson by both Mayor Giuliani and Governor Pataki
for his refusal to pursue "top charges" against a defendant allegedly responsible
for the death of a police officer); Neil MacFarquhar, Federal Judge to Resign,
Citing Political Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, at B4 (reporting the resignation of Judge
H. Lee Sarokin of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit due to
criticism of his liberal stance on criminals' rights by top Republicans, including
Bob Dole); Matthew Purdy & Don Van Natta Jr., Before the Murder, A Judicial
Journey; An Abusive Union, a Testy Judge and a Chaotic System that Failed,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1996, at BI (reporting Governor Pataki's criticism of New
York City Criminal Court Judge Lorin Duckman's decision to lower bail for
Benito Oliver, charged for assaulting his girlfriend, thus enabling him to murder
her while free on bail); Don Van Natta Jr., Under Pressure, Federal Judge
Reverses Decision in Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at Al (noting the
mounting political criticism faced by U.S. Federal District Court Judge Harold
Baer by President Clinton, Bob Dole, House Speaker Newt Gingrich and
Governor Pataki, for his ruling to suppress evidence and a videotaped confession
in a Washington Heights drug case).
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The public is then treated to a superficial, slanted account which is
used to garner the most attention. Everyone agrees that the public
has a right to know. The public also has a right to an explanation
for the legal basis of a particular ruling. Unfortunately, this
explanation is rarely, if ever, provided by the ratings-hungry media
or crusading, vote-thirsty politicians. The public's fears about crime
are easily inflamed. Some of the media is at fault for failing to
convey a complete assessment of a case. In the effort to sell
newspapers or garner higher ratings, the media does the public a
disservice. The public has the right to expect balanced reporting
and responsible journalism.
It should be remembered that the very fact that parties are in
court before a judge means that there has already been a breach of
the public order. Individuals are not in court, whether as defend-
ants, witnesses, victims or grieving family members because they
want to be there. It is because they are compelled due to untenable
circumstances. Members of the judiciary, to the best of their ability,
attempt to distribute justice evenhandedly. Judges cannot undo the
events or turn back the clock.
It must be remembered that our purpose is to dispense justice.
Judicial office is a public trust that must be preserved for future
generations. No one disputes that the justice system should be more
effective and more productive but we cannot sacrifice the quality
of justice. Just as doctors are concerned about the quality of patient
care while health management organizations are concerned about
cost-effectiveness, judges must be concerned with the quality of
justice-not the number of cases disposed of but the manner of
their disposition.
If there had been freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and
an independent judiciary, there would not have been a Holocaust
or Apartheid. It is vital that this independence be preserved to
secure the future of our democracy.

